Abstract. We present a new unifying framework for constructing non-interactive threshold encryption and signature schemes, as well as broadcast encryption schemes, and in particular, derive several new cryptosystems based on hardness of factoring, including:
Introduction
As the old saying goes, "Do not put all your eggs in one basket". Indeed, this is the basic principle underlying threshold cryptography, which distributes some cryptographic functionality amongst many users in such a way that: (1) any t + 1 parties can collectively compute the functionality; and (2) no colluding subset of t parties can compromise the security of the functionality. The two canonical applications of threshold cryptography are in public-key encryption and signature schemes, where the functionalities in consideration correspond to decryption and signing respectively. The approach was initiated in [19, 20, 21] , and there is now a large body of work on threshold signature schemes [18, 27, 40, 26, 28, 29, 8, 34, 30] and threshold encryption schemes [41, 11, 24, 34, 9, 10] .
If we are willing to settle solely for pairings-based schemes, then the main questions of practical threshold encryption and signature schemes are essentially solved. The threshold signature schemes of Boneh, Lynn, Shacham [8] and threshold encryption schemes of Boyen, Mei and Waters [10, 9] are non-interactive (each party locally computes a signature/decryption share without any interaction with the other parties), guarantees robustness against corrupted parties (given a verification key, each party can check that the signature/decryption shares are well-formed) and are well-suited for use in ad-hoc groups such as MANETs ("mobile ad-hoc networks", which arise in many wireless and military settings). The latter requirement, articulated in the recent work of Gennaro et al. [30] , means that the cryptographic protocol supports an identity space of exponential size and does not have any dependency on the total number of parties.
Given that the underlying principle of threshold cryptography is to avoid any single point of failure, it would be quite ironic of course to base all of threshold cryptography on pairings and discrete-log assumptions. A natural class of alternative assumptions would be that related to factoring, where many problems remain open. Here, virtually all threshold signature schemes are based on the RSA assumption; the only exception is the factoring-based scheme of Katz and Yung [34] , which does not support ad-hoc groups. We also do not know of any threshold encryption schemes based on hardness of factoring which supports ad-hoc groups. More notably, we do not know of any practical CCA-secure threshold encryption scheme based on hardness of factoring, even in the random oracle model; this was posed as an open problem in [41] . Similarly, very little is known about factoring-based revocation cryptosystems, a primitive seemingly unrelated to threshold cryptosystems. These are a special kind of broadcast encryption schemes [23] where a sender broadcasts encrypted messages created in such a way that all but a small subset of recipients (the "revoked" users) can decrypt the message.
This work. We present a new unifying framework for constructing non-interactive threshold encryption and signature schemes, as well as revocation schemes, and in particular, derive several new cryptosystems based on hardness of factoring, including:
-a threshold signature scheme (in the random oracle model) that supports ad-hoc groups and implements the standard Rabin signature (namely, the end-result of running the protocol is a Rabin signature and anyone can verify that signature as if it were generated by a standard centralized signer); -a threshold encryption scheme (in the standard model) that supports ad-hoc groups, where encryption is the same as that in the Blum-Goldwasser cryptosystem [5] and therefore more efficient than RSA-based implementations; -a CCA-secure threshold encryption scheme (in the random oracle model), whose computation and communication complexity is roughly that of Shoup's threshold signature scheme [40] plus that of the Hofheinz-Kiltz CCA-secure encryption scheme [32] . -a revocation cryptosystem (in the standard model) that also supports ad-hoc groups, whose complexity is comparable to that of the Naor-Pinkas scheme [36] ; moreover, we provide a variant of the construction that is CCA-secure in the random oracle model. We refer to Figure 1 for a comparison with previous factoring-based threshold cryptosystems. We also note here that our framework also captures many of the aforementioned threshold and revocation cryptosystems based on pairings and discrete-log assumptions [8, 10, 36] (see Figure 2 ).
Overview of our constructions
We proceed to provide an overview of our framework and the constructions.
Threshold extractable hash proofs. We introduce the notion of a threshold extractable hash proof system, which generalizes our recent work [42] . Informally, these hash proof systems are like the Cramer-Shoup universal hash proofs [15] in that they are a special kind of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [6] , except we replace the soundness requirement (corresponding to smoothness) with a "proof of knowledge property" [38, 17] . Specifically, the proofs are specified by a family of functions H HK (·, ·) indexed by a public key HK and takes two inputs, a tag and an instance u. We will require that H HK (·, ·) be efficiently computable either given the coin tosses used to sample the instance u, or a secret key for the corresponding tag. In addition, the family of functions is parametrized by a "threshold" value 1 t which plays the following role:
-(t + 1)-EXTRACTABILITY: given any t + 1 proofs for the same instance u on t + 1 different tags, we may efficiently "extract" a witness s for the instance (this is mostly meaningful when computing the witness given only u is hard-on-average);
-t-SIMULATABILITY: on the other hand, any t proofs reveal no "useful" information about the witness, that is, there exists a simulator that can efficiently generate proofs for t different tags for an instance u without knowing the witness. The formal requirement is stronger, namely that the simulator can generate a random HK along with the secret keys for any t different tags.
We point out here that the case t = 1 corresponds to the "all-but-one" extractable hash proofs in [42] ; that is, threshold extractable hash proofs may be regarded as a "all-but-t" analogue of extractable hash proofs.
From hash proofs to cryptosystems. With this informal overview of threshold extractable hash proofs, we can now outline how we derive threshold and revocation cryptosystems (see Figure 3 for the parameters). We note here that we are working in the model with a trusted dealer that generates HK and issues each party with identity ID with the secret key corresponding to the tag ID. This is well-suited for dynamic ad-hoc networks where any user can join the network at any time and register with the trusted dealer to obtain a secret key; however, in this work, we only address the setting where the threshold t is fixed once and for all.
-THRESHOLD ENCRYPTION: To encrypt a bit, we generate a random instancewitness pair (u, s), mask the bit using the hard-core bit of s, and publish u along with the masked bit. The decryption share from a party ID is simply a proof H HK (ID, u). The functionality requirement follows from (t + 1)-extractabilityanyone can decrypt upon receiving the shares from any t + 1 parties; moreover, t-simulatability prevents any t colluding parties from decrypting the message.
-THRESHOLD SIGNATURES: The signature for a message M is a witness s for the instance H(M ) where H(·) is a hash function modeled as a random oracle (a "full domain hash"). The signature share from a user ID is again a proof H HK (ID, H(M )); functionality and security is exactly analogous to that for threshold encryption.
-REVOCATION CRYPTOSYSTEM: Here, we want to encrypt messages in such a way that any party outside a revoked set of t users ID 1 , . . . , ID t can decrypt. (To revoke fewer than t users, we may simply add "dummy" identities.) Again, to encrypt a bit, we generate a random instance-witness pair (u, s), mask the bit using the hard-core bit of s, and publish u along with the masked bit and t proofs H HK (ID 1 , u) , . . . , H HK (ID t , u). Any party ID outside the revoked set can compute a t + 1'th proof using the secret key for the tag ID and then derive s to decrypt.
We also show how to realize robustness for signatures following [28] , and CCA security for threshold encryption and revocation schemes (with instantiations in the random oracle model). Our techniques for achieving CCA security follow the "all-butone extractable hash proof" paradigm in [42, 12, 32] , whereas most of the previous constructions [11, 22, 24] rely on the Cramer-Shoup [14, 15] or the Naor-Yung paradigm [37] which seem to be inherently limited to decisional assumptions.
Realizing threshold extractable hash proofs. We begin with an informal description of our approach for constructing threshold extractable hash proofs. The approach generalizes the direct constructions of all-but-one extractable hash proofs in [42] and provide a different perspective into those constructions. The basic idea is to exploit Shamir secret sharing in the exponent. More precisely, we sample a random degree t polynomial f subject to the constraint f (0) is a special trapdoor such that s = u f (0) . The master secret key is given by f and the public key HK is some "commitment" to the coefficients of f . The secret key corresponding to TAG is given by f (TAG) and H HK (TAG, u) := u f (TAG) . Computing H HK (TAG, u) given the coin tosses for generating u corresponds to evaluating f in the exponent. Given the hash proofs for u primitive CDH/DDH BDDH factoring threshold PKE folklore folkore new threshold signatures [27] (RO) [8] new (RO) broadcast PKE [36] [36] new CCA threshold PKE [41, 24] (RO) [10, 9] new (RO) CCA broadcast PKE [22] new new (RO) Fig. 2 . Summary of previous and present constructions from CDH/DDH, BDDH and hardness of factoring. For most primitives and assumptions, our constructions match and improve upon existing constructions. We underline the references for the two settings where existing work achieve better parameters than our work. We note that the [22] scheme only achieves a relaxed notion of CCA security.
primitive public key secret key ciphertext/signaturedecryption/signing share threshold Fig. 3 . Complexity of our BDDH and factoring-based schemes, as measured by number of group elements. For broadcast PKE, t denotes the revocation threshold. Here, secret key refers to the user/server's secret key; the dealer's secret key has size O(t).
corresponding to t + 1 distinct tags, we may recover u f (0) via Lagrangian interpolation in the exponent. This is easy for discrete-log type settings since we know the order of the group. Generating simulated proofs or secret keys for any t distinct tags is easy since the evaluation of f at any t locations look random; the main technical complication comes in having to simulate a consistent HK (though that is again easy for discrete-log type settings).
The factoring-based construction is based on Rabin's trapdoor permutation. We begin with the simple observation that we may compute a square root of u by exponentiation to the secret value (ϕ(N ) + 1)/2 = 2 −1 (mod ϕ(N )). Here, we use secret sharing over the ring Z ϕ(N ) , whereas the previous factoring-based scheme in [34] applies secret sharing to the factorization of the modulus N . In order to perform Lagrangian interpolation over the ring Z ϕ(N ) of unknown order, we build on ideas developed in the context of RSA-based schemes [40, 30] and the factoring-based cryptosystem in [32] . Informally, we set f (0) to be 2 −(t+1)⌈log N ⌉ (mod ϕ(N )). Given the hash proofs u f (TAG) corresponding to t + 1 distinct tags, we may recover u Df (0) , where D denotes an integer used to "clear the denominator" in the fractional Lagrangian coefficients and it depends on the tags used in the t + 1 proofs. In order to support an identity space of exponential size, we bound the highest power of 2 that divides D by
2
−t⌈log N ⌉ , following [30] . Given both u and u Df (0) , we may then recover s = u 1/2 using Shamir's algorithm for "GCD in the exponent" [39] . In our constructions, we "commit" to the coefficients of f instead of the evaluations of f in HK, evaluating u f (TAG) given the coin tosses used to sample u does not require interpolation; this appears to be the first time this property is exploited for RSA/factoring-based schemes and is important for handling ad-hoc networks in our revocation scheme.
Towards lattice-based instantiations. Looking forward, we plan to look into latticebased instantiations of threshold extractable hash proofs, extending the ideas and results in [2, 3] . One possible starting point is the following construction:
where m = poly(n) and f (TAG) :
The instance u is a perturbed lattice point A · s + η where s ∈ Z n q and H HK (TAG, u) is of the form f (TAG)s+η. Due to the interaction between the Lagrangian coefficients and the noise vectors, we will need to work with field sizes and approximation factors much larger than n t (c.f. [3] ). However, under sub-exponential hardness assumptions for lattice problems, we could still potentially get meaningful results for parameters such as t = √ n, say.
Preliminaries and Definitions
A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) (Gen, Enc, Dec) with key-space {0, 1} k consists three polynomial-time algorithms.Via (PK, SK) ← Gen(1 k ) the randomized key-generation algorithm produces public/secret keys for security parameter 1 k ; via (C, K) ← Enc(PK), the randomized encapsulation algorithm creates a uniformly distributed symmetric key K ∈ {0, 1} k , together with a ciphertext C; via K ← Dec(SK, C), the possessor of secret key SK decrypts ciphertext C to get back a key K which is an element in {0, 1} k or a special reject symbol ⊥. For consistency, we require that for all k and all (C, K) ← Enc(PK), we have Pr[Dec(SK, C) = K] = 1.
Binary Relations for Search Problems
Fix a family of (binary) relations R PP indexed by a public parameter PP. We require that PP be efficiently samplable given a security parameter 1 k , and assume that all algorithms are given PP as part of its input. We omit PP henceforth whenever the context is clear. We will also require that R PP be efficiently samplable, where the sampling algorithm is denoted by SampR. Intuitively, the relation R PP corresponds to a hard search problem, that is, given a random u, it is hard to find s such (u, s) ∈ R PP . More formally, we say that a binary relation R PP is one-way if:
-with overwhelming probability over PP, for all u, there exists at most one s such that (u, s) ∈ R PP ; and -there is an efficiently computable generator G such that G PP (s) is pseudorandom even against an adversary that gets PP, u, where (u, s) ← R SampR(PP). (We will also refer to G as extracting hard-core bits from s.) That is, the following quantity is negligible for all PPT A:
For relations where computing s given u is hard on average, we may derive a generator G PP with a one-bit output via the Goldreich-Levin hard-core bit GL(·) [31] (with the randomness in PP). In many cases as we shall see shortly, we may derive a linear number of hard-core bits by either iterating a one-way permutation or relying on decisional assumptions.
Threshold Extractable Hash Proofs.
We consider a family of hash functions H HK (·, ·) indexed by a public key HK, that takes as input a tag and an instance. More formally, an threshold extractable hash proof system is a tuple of algorithms (Setup, Pub, Ext, Priv) satisfying the following properties with overwhelming probability over (PP, SP): Finally, we say that a threshold extractable hash proof system is publicly verifiable if there is an efficient algorithm Ver that on input (HK, TAG, u, τ ) outputs true iff τ = H HK (TAG, u).
We define a threshold KEM (from which we can readily build a threshold encryption scheme):
(SHARING PHASE.) The set-up algorithm Setup(PP, SP, 1 t ) generates a public key PK and a master secret key MSK. Given an identity ID, the share generation algorithm computes an associated key ShareGen(MSK, ID) = SK ID .
(ENCRYPTION.) The encapsulation algorithm Enc(PK) generates (C, K), namely a random key K along with a ciphertext C.
(DECRYPTION.) The share decryption algorithm ShareDec(ID, C) takes an identity ID and computes the decryption share for that identity using its secret key SK ID . Moreover, there's a combining algorithm that takes any t + 1 decryption shares and outputs K.
Semantic Security. We define the advantage AdvThEnc A (k) to be:
Here, ShareDec(·, Enc(PK)) denotes an oracle that given an input ID, computes a fresh ciphertext C using Enc(PK) and returns ShareDec(ID, C) along with C. This captures the fact that the adversary may obtain decryption shares of fresh encryptions of known messages, and captures the security notion used in [16] with applications to secure voting. In the CCA setting, we provide A 2 with oracle access to ShareDec(·, ·), with the restriction that A 2 is only allowed to query ShareDec(·, ·) on ciphertexts different from the challenge ciphertext C. A threshold encryption scheme is said to be indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage AdvThEnc A (k) is a negligible function in k.
Decryption Consistency. We consider a notion of decryption consistency that for all ciphertexts C, there exists a unique value K such that for all (possibly malformed) t + 1 decryption shares, the combining algorithm returns a value in {K, ⊥}. Figure 4 is IND-CPA secure.
Theorem 1. If R PP is a one-way relation admitting a threshold extractable hash proof, then the threshold KEM shown in
Proof. Given a PPT A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that breaks the threshold encryption scheme, we construct a B that breaks the pseudorandomness of G as follows: on input (PP, u, K): 
It is easy to see that AdvPRG
Threshold Signature Schemes
A threshold signature scheme proceeds in two phases:
(SHARING PHASE.) The set-up algorithm Setup(PP, SP, 1 t ) generates a verification VK and a master secret key MSK. Given an identity ID, the share generation algorithm computes an associated key SK ID .
(SIGNATURE COMPUTATION PHASE.) The signature computation ShareSign(·, ·) algorithm takes an identity ID and a message and computes the signature share for that identity using its secret key SK ID . Moreover, there's a combining algorithm that takes any t + 1 signature shares and outputs the actual signature σ.
Unforgeability. We define the advantage AdvThSign A (k) to be: Proof. Given a PPT A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that breaks the threshold signature scheme, we construct a B that breaks the one-wayness of R as follows: on input (PP, u): Semantic Security. We define the advantage AdvBrEnc A (k) to be:
In the CCA setting, we provide A 2 with oracle access to Dec(·, ·), with the restriction that A 2 is only allowed to query Dec(·, ·) on ciphertexts different from the challenge ciphertext. A revocation scheme is said to be indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage AdvBrEnc A (k) is a negligible function in k. Figure 6 is IND-CPA secure.
Theorem 3. If R PP is a one-way relation admitting a threshold extractable hash proof, then the broadcast KEM shown in
Proof. Given a PPT A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that breaks the broadcast KEM, we construct a B that breaks the pseudorandomness of G as follows: on input (PP, u, K):
It is easy to see that AdvPRG
B (k) ≈ AdvBrEnc A (k). ⊓ ⊔
Instantiations for the Diffie-Hellman Relation
We consider a family of groups G of prime order q that admits a bilinear map. The secret parameter is a random α ← R Z q and the public parameter PP is given by (g, g α ) , u) ) and output G(s).
Fig. 6. Revocation scheme from threshold hash proofs
for a random g ← R G and a random α ← R Z q . We consider the Diffie-Hellman relation
PP is efficiently verifiable by computing a pairing. The associated sampling algorithm SampR picks a r ← R Z q and outputs (g r , g αr ).
Hard-core bits. Next, we explain how to obtain hard-core bits for R dh PP under various assumptions.
-The CDH assumption [1] asserts that computing g ab given (g, g a , g b ) is hard on average; here, we may extract a single hard-core bit from s using GL(s).
-The Bilinear DDH (BDDH) assumption [7] asserts that e (g, g) abc is pseudorandom given g, g a , g b , g c where g, g a , g b , g c are random elements of a bilinear group. Under BDDH, we may extract a linear number of hard-core bits from s using:
where PP is now given by (g, g α , g γ ). In addition, we may improve efficiency by pre-computing the pairing and setting PP to be (g, g α , e(g, g γ )) and computing
r . This construction extends naturally to the Gap Hashed DH assumption [35] .
Threshold hash proof system. Fix the parameters (PP, SP) = ((g, g α ), α); this also fixes a group G of prime order q. The tag space is given by F q \ {0}.
-Priv(SK TAG , u) returns u SKTAG .
where L i ∈ F q are the Lagrangian coefficients which may be efficiently computed given TAG 1 , . . . , TAG t+1 . This means u , a 1 , . . . , a t are given by the solution to the following linear system:  
. Public evaluation and t-simulation then proceed via Lagrange interpolation in the exponent.
Public verifiability. Given (HK, u, TAG, τ ), checking that τ = H HK (TAG, u) corresponds exactly to verifying that (g, g f (TAG) , u, τ ) is a valid DDH tuple. Given HK and TAG, we may compute g f (TAG) using (
. This implies public verifiability in bilinear groups.
For general groups that do not admit a bilinear pairing, we may realize public verifiability in the random oracle model following [41, Section 4.3] (also [28] ). That is, we append to H HK (TAG, u) non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that (g, g
is a valid DDH tuple. Such a proof is derived by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to Chaum-Pedersen Σ-protocol for the langugage comprising valid DDH tuples [13] ; soundness of the verification algorithm follows immediately from soundness of the Σ-protocol. Handling public and private evaluation requires more care, and we proceed differently depending on the application:
-In the application to threshold cryptosystems, we instantiate the Chaum-Pedersen protocol so that there is an efficient prover given f (TAG) as a witness. This guarantees efficient private evaluation. For public evaluation, we rely on the zeroknowledge simulator, which in turn requires programming the random oracle. This is not an issue since we only rely on public evaluation in the proof of security. -In the application to revocation cryptosystems, we instantiate the Chaum-Pedersen protocol so that there is an efficient prover given r such that u = g r as a witness. This guarantees efficient public evaluation. For private evaluation, we rely on the zero-knowledge simulator, which again requires programming the random oracle. This is not an issue since in the decryption algorithm, Ext ignores non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.
Instantiations from Hardness of Factoring
Fix a Blum integer N = P Q for safe primes P, Q ≡ 3 (mod 4) (such that P = 2p + 1 and Q = 2q + 1 for primes p, q). Following [33] , we work over the cyclic group of signed quadratic residues, given by the quotient group QR
is a cyclic group of order pq and is efficiently recognizable (by verifying that the Jacobi symbol is +1). In addition, the map x → x 2 is a permutation over QR + N . Furthermore, assuming that factoring is hard on average and that safe primes are dense, the family of permutations x → x 2 (indexed by N ) acting on the groups QR + N is one-way. In our constructions, the public parameter PP comprises (N, g), where N is a random 2k-bit Blum integer and g is chosen uniformly from QR + N . We will henceforth assume that g is a generator for QR + N , which happens with probability 1 − O(1/ √ N ). For signatures, we consider the relation
For encryption, we consider the relation:
Here, we focus on the latter relation. The associated sampling algorithm SampR picks a random r ∈ [(N − 1)/4] and outputs (g
Note that the output distribution is statistically close to the uniform distribution over QR + N whenever g is a generator. Using the Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) pseudorandom generator [4] , we may extract k hard-core bits from s that are pseudorandom even given u, that is:
Basic idea. The next claim shows that we can do Shamir secret sharing over a composite modulus:
Claim (implicit in [40] 
Proof (sketch).
That ψ is injective follows from the fact that any polynomial of degree t over Z pq that vanishes at the t + 1 distinct values v 1 , . . . , v t+1 must be identically 0 modulo p and modulo q and thus identically 0 modulo pq (by the Chinese remainder theorem). That ψ is surjective follows via Lagrange polynomial interpolation (since the pairwise differences v i − v j are all coprime with pq). 
-ShareGen(MSK, TAG) returns SK TAG := f (TAG) (mod ϕ(N )/4).
. In addition, we may compute
We make the following observations: (1) DL 1 , . . . , DL t+1 are all integers, so we may compute u
; (2) (N )/4) for i = 1, . . . , t. Moreover, we a 1 , . . . , a t are given by the solution to the following linear system:  9 Chosen-Ciphertext Security 9.1 Broadcast CCA In this section, we construct revocation schemes secure against CCA attacks.
Public verifiability, signatures and random oracles. As stated, the construction also requires public verifiability and a one-time signature scheme. For factoring-based instantiations and Diffie-Hellman in general groups, we already rely on a random oracle to implement public verifiability, so we may as well also rely on the random oracle to instantiate an efficient signature scheme. 2 For Diffie-Hellman in bilinear groups (which satisfy public verifiability without random oracles), we can avoid the use of signatures and instead use a TCR -the ciphertext is given by (u, τ ) where τ := Pub(PK, TAG, u, r) and TAG := TCR(u), and as such, we obtain efficient constructions without random oracles.
On input (VKSIG, u, τ, τ 1 , . . . , τ t , σ):
-if VKSIG = VKSIG * , return ⊥. -if σ or any of τ, τ 1 , . . . , τ t fails to verify, return ⊥.
-compute s := Ext(u, τ, τ 1 , . . . , τ t , Priv(SK VK * , u)) and output G(s).
Here, we use the fact that in both Dec ′ and Dec * , we run Ext with t + 2 valid proofs and therefore it outputs the correct witness s. GAME 3: ENCAPSULATION WITH Priv. We compute all t + 1 proofs τ, τ 1 , . . . , τ t in C * using Priv instead of Pub and sign using the secret key corresponding to VK * . GAME 4: REPLACING G(s * ) WITH RANDOM. We generate K * 0 at random from {0, 1} k instead of using G(s * ) (recall here that (u * , s * ) = SampR(r)). Observe that in Game 3, we never use knowledge of the witness s * or randomness r associated with u * . It follows from the pseudorandomness of G that Games 3 and 4 are computationally indistinguishable. Specifically, we may transform any distinguisher for Games 3 and 4 into a distinguisher K * 0 and G(s * ).
We conclude by observing that in Game 4, both K * 0 and K * 1 are identically distributed, so the probability that b ′ = b is exactly 1/2. ⊓ ⊔
Threshold CCA
In this section, we construct threshold encryption schemes secure against CCA attacks.
The main technical difficulty is as follows: the simulator knows f (TAG * 1 ), . . . , f (TAG * t ), and needs to be able to compute H HK (TAG, u) = u f (TAG) given any TAG, u. This is in order to simulate the ShareDec(TAG, ·), the decryption share for some user TAG. To handle this, we modify our basic threshold encryption scheme in three ways:
-The first modification is to add to the ciphertext which contains the instance u, a publicly-verifiable 1-threshold extractable hash proof -or, an all-but-one extractable hash proof following the terminology in [42] -for the relation (u, u f (0) ). For this, we need to turn to either pairings or the random oracle model. (Similar issues arise even in previous discrete-log based schemes not based on pairings.) This way, simulator will be able to recover the t + 1 values u f (0) , u for any well-formed ciphertext. -Next, using interpolation, we can recover u Df (TAG) , where D is some factor we use to clear out the fractional Lagrangian coefficients. In the discrete-log based instantiations, we may compute D −1 and thus recover u f (TAG) . In the factoringbased instantation, we will modify the hash function H HK (TAG, u) to be u Df (TAG) ; as such, we can only support a fixed identity space of polynomial size, since we need to compute D in advance. Similarly, we will need to modify Ext so that it computes u D 2 f (0) via Lagrange interpolation and s from both u D 2 f (0) and u via Shamir's "GCD in the exponent" algorithm.
-Finally, we modify ShareDec(·) so that it will only output the decryption share if the 1-threshold extractable hash proof verifies properly.
The details are deferred to the full version of this paper.
